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Abstract. Critical embedded systems have to provide a high level of depend-
ability. In automotive domain, for example, TDMA protocols are largely rec-
ommended because of their deterministic behavior. Nevertheless, under the 
transient environmental perturbations, the loss of communication cycles may 
occur with a certain probability and, consequently, the system may fail. This 
paper analyzes the impact of the transient perturbations (especially due to Elec-
tromagnetic Interferences) on the dependability of systems distributed on 
TDMA-based networks. The dependability of such system is modeled as that of 
“consecutive-k-out-of-n:F” systems and we provide a efficient way for its 
evaluation. 
1 Context 
For achieving deterministic real time systems, the time-triggered approach is often 
used. In particular, in order to guarantee the real time properties on the exchanges 
between distant application components, one uses TDMA-based protocols. TDMA 
slots are assigned to each data producers in a periodic (or cyclic) way with a fixed 
TDMA cycle duration. A receiver node periodically receives therefore data it con-
sumes at fixed TDMA time slots so that associated actions can be executed at the 
right time. Moreover an absence of data production or transfer can be easily detected 
by the system making the consumer to take a right decision if necessary. In practice, 
for providing more reliability, the designer of time-triggered applications generally 
makes data producers to send data to the consumer with period much smaller than 
necessary (i.e., Nyquist frequency), tolerating thus occasional production or transmis-
sion errors to some extend.  This is particularly interesting for systems operating at 
harsh conditions (i.e., subjected to environmental perturbations) provoking transient 
errors.  
For instance, when TDMA-based networks are subjected to EMI (Electromagnetic 
Interference) perturbations, which are, for example, the typical case of automotive 
networks, message transmissions can be erroneous. In most of networks such as LIN, 
TTP/C and FlexRay, transmission errors are detected but erroneous messages are not 
systematically retransmitted.  
In this paper we focus on the analysis of the dependability of a TDMA-based net-
work faced to EMI perturbations with respect to the dependability properties required 
by a safety critical application distributed on this network. In particular, examples of 
such an application are in-vehicle embedded systems. With the increasing deploy-
ment of electronic embedded components in vehicles, one hears in the media more 
and more vehicle failures due to the malfunctioning of electronic components.  
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Fig. 1. A Steer-by-Wire architecture 
If today’s identified problems find rapidly their solutions, some non-identified prob-
lems, making random behaviors of the vehicle, remains unsolved (e.g. vehicle speed 
blocked by the cruise control system). It seems that EMI perturbations are the main 
cause of those random behaviors of the vehicle. The Wall Street Journal, edited 8 
September 1997, quoted in Risk Digest, [9] talked about accidents involving vehicles, 
which to all appearances were caused by EMI. More recently in France, it happens 
that the cruise control system of certain cars behaves randomly (e.g. impossible to 
reduce the speed!). This problem can become even more critical with future integra-
tion of X-by-wire systems in a vehicle. So the behavior of such a system face to EMI 
has to be evaluated and in particular the impact of the network on the vehicle depend-
ability has to be analyzed.  
Let us consider a Steer-by-Wire system that aims to provide two main services: 
controlling the front axle actuation according to the driver's request and providing a 
“mechanical-like” force feedback to the hand wheel that is consistent with the current 
state of the vehicle. These services are assumed to be independent and we only focus 
on the “front axle actuation” service because it implies the most critical safety pur-
pose. Fig. 1 represents the computer-based architecture. Because of its safety critical-
ity, redundancy is omnipresent. Three redundant sensors, S_HW1, S_HW2, S_HW3, 
measure the driver’s request (hand wheel angle and torque), two redundant actuators, 
FA_m1 and FA_m2, act on the front axle. Two redundant micro-controllers (ECU: 
Electronic Control Unit) are used for driver’s requests filtering, HW_ECU1 and 
HW_ECU2 while two other redundant micro-controllers, FA_ECU1 and FA_ECU2, 
are dedicated to the support of the control laws for the front axle movement. Finally, 
three redundant sensors (S_FA1, S_FA2 and S_FA3) measure the state of the front 
axle and two redundant actuators, HW_m1 and HW_m2, provide the force feedback 
on the hand wheel. The four micro-controllers are connected on the redundant chan-
nels of a TDMA-like network (could be TTP/C or FlexRay). Critical functions such 
as front axle control are assumed to be executed periodically  on FA_ECU1 and 
FA_ECU2, taking into account the output of the physical system to control, environ-
mental information and the driver’s request given at the hand wheel level. This last 
information is produced periodically by HW_ECU1 and HW_ECU2 and transmitted 
through a TDMA-based network to control law (Fig. 2). The length of the TDMA 
cycle is equal to the activation period of the control law (T in Fig. 2).  
We assume that the length of the TDMA cycle is less than the minimum interval 
between two driver’s request transmissions. So the lack of driver’s request samples, 
due for example to transmission errors, during a short-term, that is for a limited num-
ber of control law consecutive executions, can be tolerated. However, it is obvious 
that long-term absence of input data at the consumer side can lead to dangerous situa-
tions. So it is important to be able to evaluate the risk that consecutive erroneous 
TDMA cycles exceed the application-tolerating threshold (in terms of a given TDMA 
cycle number or equivalently the time length). This risk is termed in this paper the 
application failure probability, which gives a metric to measure the application ro-
bustness. Obviously this probability will depend on the perturbation model. 
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Fig.  2. Drivers' request transmission 
In this paper, we propose a method for the evaluation of the application failure prob-
ability for critical systems distributed on a TDMA-based network and subject to sev-
eral profiles of EMI perturbations. This evaluation is based on the assumption that 
one single non-erroneous cycle is enough for bringing the system to its normal state.  
This hypothesis is verified for the given Steer-by-wire architecture that we use as 
example in the following.  
However, only little work has been done to deal with the application failure prob-
ability under EMI perturbations and more generally under transient faults. In [6] we 
first addressed the problem for applications distributed over CAN and introduced the 
worst-case deadline failure probability as one of the possible application dependabil-
ity metrics. In [1], the impact of the EMI on the real-time delivery capability of CAN 
and TTCAN has been evaluated. These results cannot be readily applied to the 
TDMA-based networks. In fact, CAN retransmits whenever a transmission error 
occurs whereas in TDMA-based networks, there is no systematic retransmission upon 
transmission errors. 
In our previous work (see [10] and [11]), we focused either on the evaluation of 
the X-by-wire application-tolerating threshold or the method to evaluate the applica-
tion failure probability under restrictive hypothesis on the perturbation model. For 
instance, the probability for a TDMA cycle to be erroneous, termed in the following 
“TDMA cycle error probability”, has been assumed constant. In fact it is not the gen-
eral case. A given source can cause EMI that varies in time and / or the distance be-
tween a perturbation source and the vehicle can vary in time. Chao has demonstrated 
[3] that the evaluation of the application failure probability with constant TDMA 
cycle error probability can be performed based on the classic results on the "consecu-
tive-k-out-of-n:F" systems. In this paper, we extend these results by dealing with the 
application failure probability evaluation with variable TDMA cycle error probability. 
So the previous theoretic results on the "consecutive-k-out-of-n:F" systems have to be 
extended. 
In what follows, we will give in section 2 a description of the EMI perturbations 
that an in-vehicle application can meet; such perturbations may provoke TDMA cycle 
errors (because of either transmission errors or producing errors). Section 3 is de-
voted to our main contribution that is a method for evaluating the application failure 
probability with variable TDMA cycle error probability. Section 4 shows numerical 
applications for some typical error models (TDMA cycle error probability profiles) 
and that are obtained on a Steer-by-wire system. Section 5 gives the concluding re-
marks. 
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Fig.  3. Example of electric field level of a reference road 
2 EMI perturbations and error models 
Electromagnetic interferences are mainly caused by radio-communication transmit-
ters, radars, and high voltage lines. Their influence on electronic compo-nents de-
pends on the frequency and strength of the electromagnetic fields. In automotive 
industry,  each carmaker specifies an internal regulatory policy that imposes the  ro-
bustness  level  of  electronic  device with electromagnetic interference sources under 
a given voltage level and for a given interval of frequencies. So a test process is ap-
plied on each electronic component in order to verify its conformity to the specific 
carmaker standard.  
Nevertheless, this conformity is just proved for given frequencies and voltage 
level. In fact, it is established that the testing condition are not met everywhere; it 
exists some traffic areas, for example near airports, where a vehicle can go through an 
area subject to a higher level of voltage and / or other frequencies than the specified 
ones and therefore, the probability that an in-vehicle embedded system can be cor-
rupted by electromagnetic interferences is not zero. For example, carmakers often 
consider that the upper limit for the robustness assessment of electronic components 
is 100 V/m. This is to say that when a car goes through an EMI perturbed zone with a 
force higher than 100 volts per meter, its embedded electronic systems may exhibit 
errors.   
Some sources of EMI are statically disposed along the road (for example, radars or 
high voltage lines). CEERF, a French project, funded by Ministry of Transport, pro-
posed a characterization of the electromagnetic pollution for the French road system 
(Predit-CEERF, 2003). This project targeted mainly the automotive industry by pro-
posing a cartography of the EMI sources and electromagnetic field levels in France 
and a method for its updating. These results are obtained thanks to a monitor embed-
ded in a car and whose role is to record the frequency and the level of the ambient 
electromagnetic field during a journey along several representative roads. From this 
recording, we are able to select the length (in km) of each area under EMI perturba-
tion of higher than 100 V/m (see Fig. 3); on the represented trajectory, two parts of 
this trajectory, areas Z1 and Z2, are subject to perturbations of more than 100V/m). 
 
 
 
Fig.  4. Example of an EMI zone with variable 
Without losing generality, in what follows, we will only focus on the analysis within 
one EMI zone. In fact, as assumed in section 1, for the targeted application, one sin-
gle correct reception of the input data at the consumer side before the application-
tolerating  threshold  is  required  for  bringing  the system to its normal state. So 
multiple zones (as they are independent each other) can be treated separately. In [10], 
we proposed how to evaluate the failure probability for a specific vehicle trajectory 
such as what is shown in Fig. 3. 
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Fig.  5. Evaluation of the worst interval between two valid driver’s requests 
For passing through a given EMI area, a vehicle (assumed with a constant speed) will 
take a certain time called hereafter the passing through time and denoted by Tz. If one 
knows the TDMA cycle duration Tcyc, the passing through time can also be repre-
sented in terms of the number of TDMA cycles n. In [11] and [10], for taking into 
account the worst-case protocol recovery overhead, we evaluated this value. The first 
step consists in translating an area length expressed in meters in a length given in 
seconds (termed Z in the following). Once this done, we have to evaluate how many 
cycles are possibly corrupted. Fig. 5 illustrates how to evaluate this in the worst case. 
When the filtering period is less than the TDMA cycle length (that is always the case 
of temporal redundancy through over-sampling of the hand wheel position), the worst 
case corresponds to the situation where all the replicated frames within the perturba-
tion zone are corrupted and the end of the zone corrupts the beginning of the produc-
tion of a TDMA cycle, causing thus an additional empty TDMA cycle. For the next 
valid TDMA cycle, as we assumed that the consumption takes place only after the 
last replica of a TDMA cycle, if this last replica is near the end of the TDMA cycle, it 
increases the worst interval between two valid driver’s requests by still another addi-
tional cycle. So this worst-case interval is given by:: 
 
2z
cyc
Tn
T
⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
 (1) 
 
If a rough approximation by the free space propagation model [8] can be used, the 
electric field strength at a point will be inversely proportional to the square of its 
distance to the source. 
Unfortunately, the exact characterization of the TDMA cycle error probabilities 
within a zone has not been realized because of large measurements data needed for 
being statistically confident. 
In this study, to get a general idea about the impact of EMI on the application ro-
bustness, we will evaluate the application failure probability by analyzing some typi-
cal profiles of P = (p1, p2, …, pn) called hereafter “error models”. 
2.1 Constant-P model 
This first error model describes a constant perturbation. For the total passing through 
time of n TDMA cycles of a given EMI zone, we assume that each TDMA cycle has a 
same error probability, i.e. ip p=  for all i=1, 2, …, n. 
Of course, this may not correspond to an actual situation. However, it is often the 
case of the laboratory tests. We keep it as a reference model for further comparisons. 
2.2 Radio-P model 
The second error model is a Radio-P model. It is designed to represent the error 
model of a vehicle passing through an EMI area of n TDMA cycles generated by a 
radio transmitter (e.g. Fig. 3).  
Assuming that the free space propagation model [8] is adopted and the error prob-
ability of a TDMA cycle is somehow proportional to the received electric field 
strength, for a given TMDA cycle i (i = 1, 2, …, n) we give its error probability by:  
 
21( )
2
i
ap n i b
= + − +
 (2) 
 
Where a and b (with ) are free parameters which can be adjusted for fitting 
to a concrete situation. This model is illustrated in Fig. 6. 
a b≤
This is only a general assumption. In practice, node and communication channel 
redundancy is often used to reduce the impact of EMI perturbations. The error prob-
ability estimation for a given perturbation could be more complex and field tests are 
necessary. In [10], we discussed in more detail the ways to estimate it. 
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Fig. 6 Trends of RadioP model 
2.3 Radar-P model 
The third error model is a Radar-P model. It is proposed to represent the error model 
of a vehicle passing through an EMI zone of n TDMA cycles generated by a radar 
source (e.g. near to an airport).  
The electric field varies periodically with the radar-scanning period of T (with T < 
Tz). Again we assume that the error probability of a TDMA cycle is proportional to 
the received electric field strength.  
For a given TMDA cycle i (i = 1, 2, …, n) we give its error probability by: 
 
2sinip a b iT
π= +  (3) 
 
Where a and b (with  and 0a b− > 1a b+ ≤ ) are free parameters which can be ad-
justed for fitting to a concrete situation. Fig.4 depicts the trends of a Radar-P model. 
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Fig. 7 Trends of Radar-P model 
3 Application failure probability evaluation 
3.1 Existing results for Constant-P model 
Knowing a zone of n TDMA cycles and the application-tolerating  threshold  of k  
TDMA cycles, for constant p, the problem can be treated using existing results on the 
reliability of a system composed of an ordered sequence of n components and such 
that the system fails if and only if at least k consecutive components fail. 
This kind of systems are termed “consecutive-k-out-of-n:F” systems and denoted 
by . For such a system, we note n the number of components, p the prob-
ability that a component fails,  a number of consecutive failed components and k-1 
the largest tolerable number of consecutive failed components; the reliability of the 
system is evaluated by the probability that 
( , : )C k n F
nL
nL k< , denoted by ( ) ( , ;nP L k R k n p)< = , 
or equivalently the failure probability . The follow-
ing formula was proposed first by Burr and Cane, in [2] and then simplified by Lam-
bris and Papastavridis, in 1985 [5] and Hwang, in 1986 [4]. 
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where . 1q p= −
 
The numerical evaluation of  via this formula is quite complex; so, we 
have developed in [10] a recurrent relation permitting to compute the failure probabil-
ity for any n and k. 
( , ; )R k n p
For P = (p1, p2, …, pn), as there does not exist closed form solutions, we give in the 
sequel a solution for . ( , ; )R k n P
3.2 New results for P = (p1, p2, …, pn) with non constant pi 
Now this P, without loss of generality, let us consider an infinite sequence of inde-
pendent Bernoulli trials  defined on the probability space 1 2, ,... ,...nX X X ( ), ,A PΩ  
with ( )1i ip P X= =  for . We call “word” a sequence of consecutive successes 
of Bernoulli trials (when ). 
1i ≥
1iX =
The goal of our work is to investigate the probability law of the random variable 
, the length of the longest word known during the n first trials. To our great sur-
prise, it seems that this problem, in case of the non-identically distributed random 
variables, has never been addressed. 
nL
We define: 
- the first instant where a sequence of k consecutive successes appear. kT =
-   for   and . For a fixed value of k,  , the 
sequence 
( ) ( )n nu k P L k= < 0n ≥ 1k ≥ 1k ≥
( )( )n nu k P L k= <  is decreasing and lower bounded by 0. 
- 1 2( ) ...n n k n k n kk q p p pnλ − − + − +=  for  with n k≥ 0 1q =  and  1n nq p= −  if . 1n ≥
Property1 
The sequence  verifies the following relation: (( )n nu k P L k= < )
For  and , 1k ≥ 1n k≥ +
1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )n n n n ku k u k k u kλ− −= − −  (4) 
 
with initial conditions :  
( ) 1nu k =  for  and 0 1n k≤ ≤ − ( ) ( )1k ku k kλ= − . 
 
Proof : 
We have :  
( ) ( )1 1 1...k n n n k n k n kP T n p p p q P L k− − + − − −= = <  
and  
( ) ( )n kP L k P T n≥ = ≤ , 
giving the following relation : 
 
1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )n n n n ku k u k k u kλ− − −= − 1k ≥ for  and . 1n k≥ +
End of proof 
 
Property1 contains complete information on the behavior of ( )( )n nu k P L k= <  and 
allows an exact calculation of the probability law of  and provides an efficient 
algorithm for computing . Moreover, the following useful monotonic property 
of  
nL
( )nu k
( )nu k  can be established. 
 
Property2 
If j jp p′ ≥  for all , then 1j ≥ ( ) ( )n nu k u k′≥  for all  and all .  n 1k ≥
 
That is to say :  for all  implies that  is stochastically  less or equal 
to  for all n . It turns out that 
jp p′ ≥ j 1j ≥ nL
nL′ j jp p p j′ ′′≥ ≥  for all  implies 
 for all n  and all . 
1j ≥
( ) ( ) (u′ )n n nu k u k k′′ ≥ ≥ 1k ≥
 
Algorithm 
The former recurrent relation can be implemented by the following algorithm: 
 
// initialisation 
for i=0 to k-1 do 
   U(i)=1; 
U(k)=1; 
for i=1 to k 
   U(k)=U(k)*pi  
U(k)=1-U(k) 
// evaluation of P(L<k) 
for j=k+1 to n 
   λ=1-pj-k  
   for m=1 to k 
        
   for m=1 to k 
      λ=λ∗pj-k+m  
   U(j)=U(j-1)-U(j-k-1)* λ   
// P(L<k) is U(n) 
4 Numerical results 
In this section we will apply the previously established algorithms (the complexity of 
the program varies with n) to the three typical error models described above:  
•  Constant-P,  
•  Radio-P  
•  and Radar-P. 
 
We focus on an EMI perturbation with passing through time Tz=1500ms and ap-
plication-tolerating threshold Tmax=40ms. Note that, for the Steer-by-wire system that 
we presented formerly, these values are extracted on the one hand, from the cartogra-
phy of EMI sources and electromagnetic field levels in France obtained by the Predit 
project CERF in 2003 [7] and, on the other hand, by executing a Matlab / Simulink 
model that integrates the control law, the physical system and the vehicle characteris-
tics [10]. 
For a given TDMA cycle duration Tcyc, n is given by equation 1, whereas the ap-
plication-tolerating threshold in terms of the number of TMDA cycles, k,  is given by: 
 
max
cyc
Tk
T
⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (5) 
 
Our objective is to evaluate the application failure probability Pfail for a given TDMA 
cycle duration Tcyc.  
In order to also analyze the influence of the TDMA cycle duration on Pfail, we 
make vary Tcyc and, consequently, the activation period of the control law from 4ms 
to 10ms with step of 0.25ms (these values have to be specified both by automatic 
control specialists and by system architect designer). The obtained results provide 
guidelines for system designer to correctly dimensioning Tcyc for meeting a specific 
requirement on Pfail. 
4.1 Constant-P model 
Let p = 0.1, by using the algorithm given by property1, we get the following failure 
probability Pfail (Table 1). 
 
In view of the equations 1 and 5, when Tcyc increases, n and k both decrease. As 
was seen in section 3.2, for a fixed k value, the failure probability is an increasing 
function of n. 
 
Table 1 Application failure probability under Constant-P error model 
 
TDMA 
Cycle 
Length 
Tcyc
Application 
failure 
 
Pfail
Number of 
TDMA Cycles 
 
n 
Maximum tolerable 
 number of consecutive 
erroneous cycles 
k 
4 3.30E-09 377 10 
4.25 3.12E-08 355 9 
4.5 2.95E-07 336 8 
4.75 2.79E-07 318 8 
5 2.65E-07 302 8 
5.25 2.53E-06 288 7 
5.5 2.41E-06 275 7 
5.75 2.31E-05 263 6 
6 2.21E-05 252 6 
6.25 2.12E-05 242 6 
6.5 2.04E-05 233 6 
6.75 1.98E-04 225 5 
7 1.91E-04 217 5 
7.25 1.84E-04 209 5 
7.5 1.77E-04 202 5 
7.75 1.72E-04 196 5 
8 1.67E-04 190 5 
8.25 0.00161977 184 4 
8.5 0.00157484 179 4 
8.75 0.0015299 174 4 
9 0.00148497 169 4 
9.25 0.00144902 165 4 
9.5 0.00140408 160 4 
9.75 0.00136813 156 4 
10 0.00133218 152 4 
4.2 Radio-P model 
Let a = 10 and 11, b = 20 and 19 respectively, pi are given according to equation 2. 
The failure probability Pfail for different Tcyc is given in Table 2. In addition to the 
general comments we have already made for the Constant-P case, we can also ob-
serve the effect of property 2.  
Table 2 Application failure probability under Radio-P error model 
TDMA-Cycle
Length 
Tcyc
Application 
failure 
(a=10, b=20)
Pfail
Application 
failure 
(a=11, b=19) 
P’fail
Number of
TDMA  
Cycles 
n 
Maximum tolerable 
number  of consecutive 
erroneous cycles 
k 
4 2.22E-08 8.19E-08 377 10 
4.25 2.94E-07 9.73E-07 355 9 
4.5 3.30E-06 9.82E-06 336 8 
4.75 3.30E-06 9.82E-06 318 8 
5 3.30E-06 9.82E-06 302 8 
5.25 3.12E-05 8.32E-05 288 7 
5.5 3.12E-05 8.32E-05 275 7 
5.75 2.46E-04 5.86E-04 263 6 
6 2.46E-04 5.86E-04 252 6 
6.25 2.46E-04 5.86E-04 242 6 
6.5 2.46E-04 5.86E-04 233 6 
6.75 0.001609891 0.00340238 225 5 
7 0.001609891 0.00340238 217 5 
7.25 0.001609891 0.00340238 209 5 
7.5 0.001609891 0.00340238 202 5 
7.75 0.001609891 0.00340238 196 5 
8 0.001609891 0.00340238 190 5 
8.25 0.008690406 0.01621666 184 4 
8.5 0.008690406 0.01621666 179 4 
8.75 0.008690406 0.01621666 174 4 
9 0.008690406 0.01621666 169 4 
9.25 0.008690406 0.01621666 165 4 
9.5 0.008690406 0.01621666 160 4 
9.75 0.008690406 0.01621666 156 4 
10 0.008690406 0.01621666 152 4 
 
In fact, if we note: P = (p1, p2, …, pn)  for 10a =  and 20b = ,  
 P’ = (p’1, p’2, …, p’n) for 11a =  and 19b = ,  
According to equation 2, it turns out that p’i > pi for all i = 1, 2, …, n. So it is not 
surprising that P’fail > Pfail in Table 2. 
 
Table 3 Application failure probability under Radar-P error model 
TDMA-Cycle 
Length 
Tcyc
Application 
failure 
Pfail
Number of 
TDMA Cycles
n 
Maximum tolerable number of 
consecutive erroneous cycles 
k 
4 5.55E-07 377 10 
4.25 2.93E-06 355 9 
4.5 1.57E-05 336 8 
4.75 1.47E-05 318 8 
5 1.38E-05 302 8 
5.25 7.53E-05 288 7 
5.5 7.14E-05 275 7 
5.75 3.92E-04 263 6 
6 3.74E-04 252 6 
6.25 3.57E-04 242 6 
6.5 3.42E-04 233 6 
6.75 0.00192067 225 5 
7 0.00184522 217 5 
7.25 0.0017695 209 5 
7.5 0.00170302 202 5 
7.75 0.00164584 196 5 
8 0.00158847 190 5 
8.25 0.00907411 184 4 
8.5 0.008806 179 4 
8.75 0.00853722 174 4 
9 0.00826772 169 4 
9.25 0.00805156 165 4 
9.5 0.0077806 160 4 
9.75 0.0075632 156 4 
10 0.00734519 152 4 
 
This kind of numerical results can be used to verify whether a given application, 
distributed on TDMA-based networks and under a known EMI zone, can still meet 
the dependability constraint in terms of failure probability. It can also provide to a 
designer with guidelines for correctly dimensioning Tcyc for meeting a specific re-
quirement on application failure probability. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper we have investigated the impact of the EMI perturbations on the de-
pendability of applications distributed around TDMA-base networks where we as-
sumed that application failure occurs when consecutive erroneous TDMA cycles 
exceed a certain threshold. This problem is of prime importance, especially for auto-
motive industry as on the one hand, the most adopted embedded networks such as 
LIN, CAN and FlexRay are based on TDMA, and on the other hand many embedded 
applications (e.g. X-by-Wire systems) have to meet stringent dependability con-
straints, this even under EMI perturbations. We contributed to the method for evaluat-
ing the application failure probability. For this, we have proposed an important theo-
retic result which extends the existing one on the "consecutive-k-out-of-n:F" systems 
to including variable probability.  Although we have only analyzed several typical 
error models, our method is still available whatever the profile of pi may be. These 
probabilities can be obtained in practice by measurements. This method can also be 
used to study the system dependability of any transient perturbations. 
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